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Typical democracy measures rely upon categorical classi cation or continuous indices to 
indicate the level of democracy in a study’s nations. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
techniques, we demonstrate an alternative method for measuring democracy that retains 
– in the measure itself – the full-range of included components, which previous measures 
use in their construction, but conceal in their resultant scores. We directly compare the 
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between incommensurate components, and (b) reveal components used to calculate 
existing measures that do not substantially contribute to nations’ democratic classi cation 
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1. WHEN YOU CAN’T ADD IT UP
Democracy is a centrally important concept to scholars doing cross-national 
research (whether political scientists, sociologists, or other disciplines), policy 
makers, and even casual observers of current world events. Previous research 
examines the relationship between democracy and economic development 
(Sirowy and Inkeles 1991; Przeworski et al. 2000), the accumulation of social 
capital (Paxton 2002; Muller and Seligson 1994) and war (Jones, Bremer and 
Singer 1996; Leng and Singer 1988). Democracy is included in research as the 
dependent variable (Burkhardt and Lewis-Beck 1994; Putnam 1993), among the 
independent variables (Muller and Seligson 1994; Hewitt 1977), and is modeled 
as an interdependent relationship (Paxton 2002). To date, however there is no 
universally accepted means of evaluating whether a nation is democratic, or to 
measure the various “levels” of democracy observed.
Presently, researchers are forced to choose whether to demarcate democratic 
classi cation according to an ideal-typical dichotomy (e.g., Alvarez et al. 1999; 
Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996; Muller 1988; Gastil 1978) or tabulated index (e.g., 
Marshall and Jaggers 2001b; Bollen 1998). In this paper, we develop an alternate 
descriptive typology of democracy, based on Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) (Ragin 2000; 1987). We demonstrate how this alternative measure retains 
more of the fullness of existing data than either of the just mentioned approaches. 
We provide several comparisons between a QCA democracy measure and 
previous dichotomous or indexed measures. We make direct contrasts to highlight 
several of the weaknesses in the current approach. We then explore the relationship 
between democracy and economic development using this QCA measure and 
several previous measures. These comparisons show the advantages of the QCA 
measure, and underscore several important applications for future research. The 
QCA measure allows researchers to include democracy in a wide range of studies; 
but to do so in a way that neither requires as-yet unachieved de nitional consensus, 
nor the forced inclusion/exclusion of potentially salient democratic characteristics.
2. BACKGROUND
The word democracy comes from the Greek, demos (people) and kratos (power), 
indicating a government of, by and for the people (Arat 1991). Presently, although 
all studies, measures, and applications of democracy derive from this single root, 
existing conceptualizations of democracy vary widely (Munck and Verkuillen 
2002). Dahl’s (1971) concept of polyarchy is one of the most commonly accepted 
operationalizations of democracy applied (or adapted) in current democracy 
measures and research (e.g., Coppedge and Reinecke 1991; Bollen 1990). There 
are, however, others who argue for a different conceptualization of democracy 
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(e.g., Lijphart 1999; and Lindblom 2002). In what follows, we discuss Dahl’s 
components of “democraticness” to lay groundwork for the ensuing discussion. 
While the argument in this paper draws largely on examples derived from Dahl’s 
de nition of democracy, other component sets could easily be used.1
Table 1 Dahl’s (1971) Minimum Requirements for Democracy
Participationa Contestation
1 - Freedom to form and join organizations 5 -  Right of political leaders to compete for 
support (and votes)
2 - Freedom of expression 6 - Alternative sources of information
3 - Right to vote 7 - Free and fair elections
4 - Eligibility for public of ce 8 -  Institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference
a – While the initial presentation of the eight criteria (Dahl 1971:3) does not break them into these categories, 
the importance of participation and competition (or contestation) becomes clear in latter parts of Dahl’s book.
2.1 Existing Measures
The construction of any democracy measure requires  rst settling on a set of 
criteria. Dahl, for example, de nes eight minimum criteria for political democracy 
(1971: 13), which we reproduce in Table 1. Other examples abound. For 
instance, Bollen (2001) constructs his LIBDEM index from  ve factors based on 
Dahl’s requirements: political rights (POLRT), right to vote (SUFF), legislative 
effectiveness (LEGEF), legislative selection (LEGSEL), and party legitimacy.2 
This index ranges from 0-100, where zero represents the complete absence of any 
democratic tendencies and a score of 100 corresponds with ‘perfect’ democracy. 
Arat (1991) calculates his score similarly by including measures of participation, 
inclusiveness, competitiveness and coerciveness for each nation to calculate 
scores, which range from 29-109.3 In addition, Coppedge and Reinecke (1991) 
draw from Dahl’s original components of democracy to develop 10 scale types. 
Coppedge and Reinecke themselves note some of the dif culties experienced in 
trying to collapse multiple items into a single index. For example, in 1985, “thirty 
three countries do not  t the scale types perfectly” (1991:52) and are classi ed as 
“approximately equivalent” types to one of the closest  tting perfect scale types.
Several other commonly cited sources, such as the Freedom in the World 
Rankings (Gastil 1978) or the World Human Rights Guide (Humana 1986), 
incorporate many different facets of democracy, and then collapse those facets 
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into easily reportable indices. Gastil for example calculates two categorical 
scales, measuring political rights (ranging from 0-32) and civil liberties (0-52), 
which are each then collapsed to seven point scales. He then further reduces 
countries to three distinct democratic categories: free, partly free, and not free. 
Prezworski and colleagues (2000) similarly reduce their classi cation of regime 
types into Autocracy, Bureaucracy, Parlaimentarism, and Presidentialism, while 
also allowing for mixed types. There are also more blunt measures that yield 
dichotomous classi cations of democracy and non-democracy (e.g., Alvarez et 
al 1999; Muller 1988; Hewitt 1977). While there are many other commonly used 
measures, the foregoing provides a general overview of current measures and how 
they are constructed.4
2.2 Critiques of the Current Approach
Regardless of the set of characteristics chosen, or how they are combined into 
indices, these measures of democracy require comparisons among characteristics 
that are uniquely important, and not directly comparable or interchangeable (Dahl 
1971). In brief, collapsing a range of items into a single indicator masks variation 
among the unique components of a scale. Here, we summarize four potential 
problems that this masking produces. 
First, the compiled measures may produce scores that are similar (or even 
identical) for countries with differing compositions of democratic characteristics. 
All of the present methods for computing democracy scores necessarily must 
determine which single characteristic, or set of characteristics, quali es a country 
as democratic,5 or establish a means to quantify the comparative “value” of each 
democratic component. 
Several examples are instructive. In Bollen’s index (2001), a decrease by half of 
the percentage of the population eligible to vote diminishes a country’s democracy 
score by twice as much as does a reduction by half of the level of political 
rights.6 These forced comparisons can result in similar, or even identical, scores 
for countries that have markedly different traits that compose their democracy 
scores. As a case in point, Brazil, Honduras, South Korea, Peru, The Phillippines, 
Sudan, Uruguay, and Turkey all have scores of 70.833 in Bollen’s 1988 index of 
liberal democracy (2001). Table 2, however, shows the variations in the measures 
compiled to create these countries’ equal composite scores. The QCA measure 
we propose does not require the collapsing of measures or comparisons that mask 
such country differences.
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Table 2 Liberal Democracy Composition of Select Countries (1988)
Examined Characteristic
Country Political Rights
(POLRT)
Product (LEG) of Legislative 
Selection (LEGSEL)& 
Legislative Effectiveness 
(LEGEF)
Party 
Legitimacy
(PARTY)
Percent of 
Adult Suffrage 
(SUFF)
Liberal 
Democracy 
Score 1988
(LIBDEM)
Brazil 8.333 6.667 6.667 98.10 70.833
Honduras 8.333 6.667 6.667 98.10 70.833
S. Korea 8.333 6.667 6.667 98.80 70.833
Peru 8.333 6.667 6.667 97.60 70.833
Philippines 8.333 6.667 6.667 99.00 70.833
Sudan 5.000 3.333 10.000 99.00 70.833
Turkey 8.333 6.667 6.667 96.40 70.833
Uruguay 10.000 6.667 6.667 97.70 70.833
Second, because studies use a (frequently non-overlapping) variety of 
characteristics in their democracy measures, meaningful comparison of  ndings 
relying on different measures is dif cult, if not impossible. Many subsequent 
applications of the measures rely upon the summary scores adopted from more 
in depth explorations (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994 use Gastil 1978 for 
their outcome measure; Muller and Seligson 1998 rely on Freedom House 2002 
among their independent variables). Therefore, the differences that do exist in 
used summary scores may be obscured in the reported analyses. Moreover if 
other researchers merely use these summary scores without also examining their 
composite contributions, they may be unaware of individual indicator variations 
across included cases. Further still, readers of research only employing the 
summary scores would have virtually no means for identifying any underlying 
differences that exist. The QCA measure we propose does not mask cross-country 
component differences. Instead, it clearly indicates the presence or absence of 
each component suggested by the adopted democracy de nition.
Third, while most measures use multiple components to calculate their 
 nal scores of democracy, in practice, quali cation as democratic (or more 
speci cally, non-democratic) in those indices is frequently based on a limited 
set of characteristics (fewer than the full set used to calculate the index). One 
of the primary motivations for using a composite index is that multiple factors 
contribute to the level of democracy. If a composite index is found, in effect, to 
hinge quali cation as a democracy on a limited number of selected characteristics, 
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part of the justi cation for using a composite index in the  rst place is eliminated. 
Below we use QCA techniques to directly examine the sets used in some existing 
democracy measures.
The  nal potential limitation stems from the use of existing measures, not 
of the measures themselves. The sets of characteristics, and their combinations 
observed are well studied, understood and applied by the researchers who 
constructed the measures (e.g., Bollen 2001; Marshall and Jaggers 2001a; 2001b). 
Unfortunately, when subsequent researchers merely include these summary scores 
in their analyses of the relationship between democracy and other factors, their 
understanding of these relationships may be limited because of their unfamiliarity 
with the democratic features of each country or case. 
Incidentally, if those researchers using democracy measures considered more 
than just the resulting summary scores produced by these studies, the other three 
weaknesses mentioned above would be less problematic. Many researchers 
including democratic scores in their analyses, however do little more than plug 
in the democracy summary scores. Therefore, a typology that includes more of 
the collected information would improve knowledge of nations’ democratic 
composition for the end-use researchers employing such a measure. The relative 
advantage of the QCA democracy measure we construct, over existing measures, 
is most clearly seen in such applications. We therefore compare the results of 
a simple analysis using traditional measures and our QCA measure to examine 
the relationship between democratization and economic development. To be able 
to clearly make those comparisons, we must  rst describe the proposed approach.
3. CONSTRUCTING AND INTERPRETING A QCA MEASURE OF DEMOCRACY 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 2000; 1987) simultaneously 
incorporates the bene ts of a traditional qualitative approach – of examining 
cases as wholes – with the systematic capabilities generally found in quantitative 
methodologies.7 Variables are each classi ed into limited categories, typically 
presence (one) or absence (zero), which are compiled into a Truth Table.8 This 
Truth Table includes the combinations of all included variables for every case. In 
these tables, a single letter represents each variable, with upper and lower cases 
respectively representing presence and absence. 
For example, if we use “S/s” to denote universal suffrage, “S” would indicate 
its presence and “s” its absence. Rows of a “Truth Table” generate terms, which 
then represent the entire case, for which multiplication denotes logical AND. 
For example, supposing the adoption of Dahl’s characteristics as the criteria 
included in a democracy measure, the term “SfX” would therefore indicate 
a country in which we  nd the simultaneous presence of universal suffrage (S), 
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AND the absence of free and fair elections (f), AND the presence of freedom of 
expression (X).
The QCA approach can then compare the complete set of terms for all cases 
in a sample to identify each unique combination of included indicators that is 
associated with outcomes of interest. It does so by computing “reduced” equations 
that summarize the complete set of combinations that generate an examined 
outcome for the observed set of cases.9 In these “reduced” equations, multiplication 
continues to denote logical AND while addition indicates logical OR. Any omitted 
variable, for individual cases (terms) or reduced equations, indicates any status 
(presence or absence) of that variable. Suppose that the requirements chosen 
were: (1) the right for citizens to vote, both through (a) universal male (M/m) and 
(b) female suffrage (G/g), (2) the eligibility to hold public of ce (E/e), (3) the 
existence of free and fair elections (F/f), (4) freedom of expression (X/x), (5) the 
opportunity to form and join organizations (J/j), (6) the existence of a government 
that is responsive to popular opinion (R/r),  and (7) the right of potential elected 
of cials to compete for votes (V/v). Using those variables, the equation:
(1) (A) MfX  +  (B) Grx   +  (C)  MGEFXJRV ! ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
would indicate three separate combinations that are observed as suf cient to 
produce economic development for a set of observed cases. Term A shows that the 
presence of universal male suffrage (M) AND the absence of free and fair elections 
(f) AND the presence of freedom of expression (X), AND any combination of the 
variables not included in the  rst term (G or g, E or e, X or x, R or r, and V or v) 
is suf cient to generate economic development for one set of cases in the study. 
Alternatively, for another set of countries in the study, Term B would indicate 
that economic development arises via the combination of the presence of female 
suffrage (G) AND the absence of a responsive government (r) AND the absence 
of free speech (x), AND any combination of the variables not included in the 
second term. Finally Term C indicates that other countries in the study achieve 
economic development through the simultaneous presence of all eight conditions. 
Each term in Equation 1 therefore represents a suf cient combination to produce 
economic development in the study sample. Furthermore, while any one of them 
is individually identi ed as suf cient, at least one of them is necessary to observe 
the outcome for the cases in the study. In other words, for the observed cases 
no other combination of these democratic indicators would generate economic 
development. 
With this method of compiling democracy scores, each criterion is included, 
comparisons of potentially incommensurable components are unnecessary, and 
what is included in the measure is clearly represented in the measure itself – both 
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for the construction of the measure and for its use in subsequent evaluation of 
outcomes.
4. COMPARING THE QCA MEASURE TO EXISTING DEMOCRACY SCORES
4.1 Direct Comparison
Some existing measures build on the same sets of criteria to determine democratic 
quali cation, while others use distinctly dissimilar sets. Researchers’ different 
theoretical and empirical motivativations may guide their measurement 
constructions. What is included and how they are combined is unobservable in the 
 nal measurement schemes – whether dichotomous, classi catory or continuously 
composed. A QCA measure explicitly details each of the characteristics included 
in the  nal typology, comparisons to other measures or the components included 
therein are readily available. Additionally, whereas composite measures may 
produce similar scores for countries that do not have similar levels of democracy, 
or have differing constructions of democracy (as in the Bollen example in Table 2 
above), our QCA measure does not obscure any of the component differences 
that exist between countries. The scores produced clearly indicate the presence or 
absence of each of the indicators suggested by the adopted de nition of democracy.
Beyond these de nitional advantages of a QCA measure, one can also evaluate 
the motivations offered for previous studies’ constructions of dichotomous or 
continuous democracy measures. We use one possible construction of the QCA 
measure to explore the necessary and suf cient conditions for quali cation as 
democracy and non-democracy, for three commonly used measures (Bollen 2001; 
Marshall and Jaggers 2000b; and Freedom House 2002), in 80 nations for 1988.10 
In this example, we use the full set of requirements as speci ed by Dahl to provide 
the widest spectrum of comparison.11  It could be argued that the proper comparison 
would only include those measures used to compile the index; we therefore note 
where that approach would alter the  ndings below.
4.1.1 Minimized Equations
Using fs/QCA software (Drass, 2000), we compute reduced equations for three 
existing democracy measures on the various indicators used to construct those 
measures. In this computation, the outcome of interest is a country’s classi cation as 
democratic (or non-democratic) on the various measures. Democratic quali cation 
for each measure is de ned as follows: a score of greater than 95.00 on Bollen’s 
liberal democracy scale (anything below 95.00 is classi ed as non-democratic);12 
a score of 10 on the polity scale (anything below 10 is classi ed as non-democratic); 
and classi cation as “free” in the Freedom in the World rankings (partially free and 
not free are classi ed as non-democratic). Table 3 presents the reduced equations 
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for democratic quali cation (Panel 1) and for non-democratic quali cation (Panel 
2) for each of these measures. The reduced equations in this instance apply the 
measures from Dahl as listed in Table 1, using necessary and suf cient cause 
analysis (Ragin, 1987) at a con dence level of p < 0.05.13 
Table 3 Reduced QCA Equations for Existing Measures 
Measure Equation “Outcome”
= Democratic
Libdem MEFXRV > 95.00
Polity IV MEFXJRV = 10
Freedom in the World MEXV + MERV = Free
= Non-Democratica
Libdem fxj + fr < 95.00
Polity IV fxj + jr < 10
Freedom in the World fjr = Partially / Not free
a – In the reduced equations for non-democracy, the terms for absence of universal suffrage or freedom of 
expression are actually subsumed under one of the other terms as well. In all cases where either of these vari-
ables is absent, the observed nations are classi ed as non-democratic, but only exist coupled with one of the 
terms listed in the Non-Democratic combinations presented in the table.
4.1.2 Qualifying Democracies
The motivation for using the full list of components in a composite index suggests 
that all included components are required for democratic quali cation. Stated as 
a QCA equation (using the variables de ned in Table 1), this would require that:
(2) M G E F X J R V = democracy.14
As such, the reduced equations for quali cation as democracy for these three 
measures (Panel A, Table 3) are not particularly surprising. For Bollen’s (2001) 
liberal democracy scale, the reduced equation indicates that the presence or absence 
of the freedom to form and join organizations (absence of “J/j” from the term) 
combined with the simultaneous presence of all other variables leads to a score of 
greater than 95.00. Since this measure does not explicitly include the “organizations” 
component of Dahl’s de nition, democratic quali cation is contingent upon actual 
presence of all terms explicitly included. For the polity score from Polity IV, all 
seven of Dahl’s requirements are necessary for a score of 10. 
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The Freedom in the World Rankings (Freedom House 2002) classify as “free” 
any nation that simultaneously offers: universal suffrage AND open eligibility 
for public of ce AND unquali ed respect for the freedom of information AND 
a competitive electoral process; OR universal suffrage AND open eligibility for 
public of ce AND a responsive government AND a competitive electoral process. 
The Freedom in the World rankings do not appear by this account to require free 
and fair elections, freedom of expression, or freedom to form and join organizations 
for quali cation as a “free” nation. Use of Gastil’s rankings in subsequent research 
frequently relies upon his most summarized form of classi cation (free, partially 
free, not free) (e.g., Dixon and Senese 2002), rather than his 7-point scales. 
These data-summary techniques, whether to 7 point scales or the trichotomous 
classi cation scheme, rely on less than the full set of indicators for democratic 
quali cation.
4.1.3 Qualifying Non-Democracies
If each of these components were necessary for democratic quali cation, then 
the reverse would be the best motivation for constructing composite indices. In 
other words, a more thorough investigation of the existing measures would require 
testing the negative of Equation 2, which indicates that the absence of any single 
included indicator should be suf cient for quali cation as non-democracy. Stated 
as a QCA equation:
(3) m + g + e + f + x + j + r + v = non-democracy.
The results of the reduced equations in Table 3 however show that this is not 
the case for the observed nations in the examined measures.15 For the liberal 
democracy index, the simultaneous absence of free and fair elections AND 
absence of freedom of expression AND absence of the freedom to form and join 
organizations (fxj); OR the simultaneous absence of free and fair elections AND 
governmental responsiveness (fr) are suf cient for quali cation as non-democratic. 
The  rst term for non-democratic quali cation in the Polity IV index is identical 
to that in the liberal democracy scale while the second scenario suf cient for non-
democratic quali cation is the simultaneous absence of the ability to form and join 
organizations AND the absence of a responsive government (jr). For the Freedom 
in the World rankings, non-democratic quali cation depends on the simultaneous 
absence of free and fair elections AND absence of the ability to form and join 
organizations AND absence of a responsive government (fjr).
The Liberal Democracy and Polity IV measures do not hinge quali cation as 
non-democracy on competitiveness of the electoral process (E/e or V/v). This 
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is particularly surprising for the liberal democracy scores (Bollen 2001) due to 
Bollen’s stated emphasis on Dahl’s requirements (1990:16-17). The absence of 
universal suffrage (s) is also not suf cient for quali cation as non-democracy on 
the liberal democracy or Polity IV measures. The Freedom in the World Rankings 
include among the non-democratic countries those that have the presence OR 
absence each of universal suffrage, open eligibility for public of ce, freedom of 
expression, and competitiveness of the electoral process. Further, several of the 
key “requirements” included in these measures are more common in the non-
democratic countries than in the democratic ones (e.g., among non-democratic 
nations - NE = 44, Ne = 10; and NM = 54, Nm = 4). While any of these requirements 
may seem conceptually suf cient for classifying a country as non-democratic, we 
show here that each of the observed measures relies on less than the full set of 
included indicators for non-democratic classi cation, thus potentially diminishing 
the motivation for using the composite scores.16 
4.2 Indirect Comparisons
4.2.1 Democracy and Economic Development
Most cross-national research on democratic development suggests that high 
levels of economic growth are strongly linked to the rise of political democracy 
(Inglehart 1990; Diamond 1992; Kitschelt 1992; Muller 1997). Researchers also 
suggest that democratic development has implications for economic growth. 
Bunce (2000) suggests that economic development  nds its most important 
political contribution in its capacity to help sustain democracy. While democratic 
ideas and institutions may rise in both rich and poor nations, the greatest prospects 
for democratic persistence over time occur when economic development is high 
(Evans and White eld 1995; Yi Feng 1997; Clague et al. 2001). Democratic states, 
thus, have a vested interest in economic prosperity. These  ndings are of particular 
importance for democracies in transition as well as those of tenuous stability. We 
use the foregoing discussion as a theoretical foundation to examine the association 
between democratic development and economic growth.   
The following example shows the improvements researchers would gain from 
using a QCA measure instead of a composite index in exploring relationships 
between economic development and democracy. We gather the Polity IV scores 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2001b), the measures used to construct those scores 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2001a; 2001b) and GDP levels per capita (United Nations 
2005)17 for 38 countries for three time periods,18 to calculate the correlation 
between GDP changes each from t0 – t1 and t1 - t2 and the Polity IV scores (at t0 and 
t1 respectively). We then compare these results to an analysis using the same GDP 
information and a tabulated QCA summary score of democracy for each of the 
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nations using only the 5 components that are included in the Polity IV democracy 
scores. In other words the comparisons presented in this example are based on the 
exact same information but rely on two different methods of summarizing that 
information. 
Researchers interested in testing the hypothesis that democratic development 
contributes to economic growth, at the bivariate level, would calculate the 
correlation between the democracy score at t0 and the change in GDP from t0-t1. 
Similarly, with the data described above, we could calculate the correlation between 
democracy score at t1 and the change in GDP from t1-t2. In these data, the calculated 
correlations would provide support to the contention that democracy is associated 
with economic development (r(Dt0,!GDPT0-T1) = 0.874, p<0.001, r(Dt1,!GDPt1-t2) 
= 0.733, p<0.001). However, of the 38 countries observed, there are 16 nations 
with Polity IVt0 scores below zero who experienced GDP growth from t0-t1 (mean 
growth = 62.34%, range 2-171% growth). Additionally, there are two countries 
with Polity IVt1 scores of 10 with GDP declines of 1.5 and 7.5% respectively. Each 
of these countries reduce the correlation observed using traditional approaches, 
but do not necessarily contradict the hypothesized relationship. Their perceived 
contradiction is merely an artifact of the correlation-based approach.
In this simple example, we observe several of the advantages of the comparative 
measure. The  rst advantage is readily apparent when we simply substitute QCA 
analysis for the correlational approach. We tabulate QCA measures of democracy, 
using the same  ve indicators which are used to compute the Polity scores: X/x 
denotes the presence/absence respectively of regulation of participation (PARREG), 
J/j the competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP), V/v the competitiveness of 
executive recruitment (XRCOMP), E/e the openness of executive recruitment 
(XROPEN) and R/r the executive constraints (XCONST).19 We code the highest 
score on each of these indicators as 1 and anything below that as 0. For this 
analysis, any GDP gain (from tx-tx+1) greater than zero dollars is coded as 1 and 
scores that remain the same or decline are coded as zero for economic increase. 
When using fs/QCA software to compute necessary and suf cient causes (Ragin, 
1987) at a con dence level of p < 0.10, we get the following equation for both time 
periods:20
(4) XJVE ! GDP increase.
This equation indicates that the presence of the four terms included (XJVE) 
and either the presence or absence of executive constraints (R/r) facilitates 
GDP increases.21 The XJVER term is consistent with theories suggesting that 
democracy contributes to economic growth. However, the XJVEr term would be 
a contradictory result to this prediction, decreasing the correlation between the 
jimi adams, Daniel Tope
When you Can’t Add it Up: Measuring Democracy with QCA
43
two in any correlation (or multi-variate regression) analysis that includes only 
such a composite score. In any such analyses, these contradictory terms would 
be problematic, or in some analyses excluded as outliers. Instead, we show that 
by including them we can  nd increased support for the underlying theoretical 
relationship between democracy and economic development. While this example 
only shows the inclusion of democracy indicators in the proposed relationship, 
multivariate analyses using these indexes would experience the same dif culties 
with contradictory terms and outliers.
This example also demonstrates the potential bene ts of incorporating the 
underlying motivations of case-oriented qualitative research. What case analyses 
allow is the exploration of unique constellations of factors, as they actually exist, 
rather than forcing researchers to falsely categorize countries beyond what the 
data permits. If we measure only the  ve indicators that are included in the Polity 
IV measure, to permit inclusion of each of the potential combinations of those 
 ve variables in a traditional analysis, we would have to compute and include 24 
interaction terms. QCA analysis allows us to, in effect, simultaneously include 
each of those interactions as well as the  ve direct indicators. This bene t is 
perhaps best represented in the countries with the lowest polity scores in these 
data. There are 42 country-year combinations with observed QCA democracy 
con gurations of xjvEr, of which 20 show GDP increases. Researchers interested 
in the relationship between these two characteristics can build on the observation 
that from t0-t1 GDP increases occur in 4/19 cases and from t1-t2 in 16/23 cases. If 
they wanted to investigate this discrepancy further, the addition of only two more 
variables would increase the potential interaction terms to include to well over 
100, which would be virtually impossible mathematically, and similarly dif cult 
to interpret if calculable. 
Additionally, using our QCA measure removes the implicit assumption included 
in the correlation-based approach that requires that any increase in democratic 
indicators results in economic increase, which is an assumption not shared by 
the theoretical literature. This is an assumption that is merely an artifact of the 
modeling strategies employed, not in the proposed theoretical relationship.
4.2.2 Measurement Adaptability
The  nal advantage gained by using our QCA democracy measure is the ready 
 exibility available to researchers. Structural Equation Modeling techniques have 
shown that all that is necessary for researchers to replicate regression and SEM 
analyses is for researchers to include the correlation matrix between included 
measures. A QCA measure of democracy would introduce similar research 
transparency. As mentioned above, researchers who construct the many used 
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measures of democracy often collect substantially more information than is used 
by analysts who include those measures in later research. Using a QCA typology 
would allow researchers and analysts alike to more fully represent the information 
residing in collected data than can the present practice of simply entering scores 
into a regression equation.
This could be accomplished by including the Truth Table (see Appendix 1 for 
an example), and/or the methods of constructing a Truth Table (see Appendix 2 
for a potential means to tabulate QCA scores using Dahl’s eight components). 
As mentioned previously, researchers have still not reached a consensus of what 
indicators should be included in a democracy measure. Using a comparative 
measure would allow researchers to add or remove components, as they deem 
theoretically relevant to the analysis in their particular research, by simply adding 
(or subtracting) a row to the Truth Table. This allows for a disentangling of 
aggregate measures of democracy and better sets the stage for theory building 
based on more nuanced components of particular political systems at particular 
points in time. 
Additionally, in some cases, the commonalities that exist across nations are 
hidden by variations in the composite indices or categorical measures. For example, 
by 1988 all of the countries included in Appendix 1 extended the eligibility to vote 
to women. This shared characteristic across all of the countries included would not 
be observable to researchers who rely only upon summary scores.
Returning to the example nations in Table 2 that each had identical liberal 
democracy scores (70.8333) in 1988, the QCA democracy terms for each in 1988 
are (from Appendix 1): Brazil – MGEfXJrV, South Korea – MGEfxjrV, Peru – 
MGEfxjrV, Philippines – MGEfxjRV, and Turkey – MGEfxjrv.22 Other than the 
constant presence of universal male and female suffrage and the openness of 
eligibility for public of ce and an absence of free and fair elections, these nations 
vary in their compositions of democracy. While this does not necessarily allow 
for examination of the “levels” of democracy in each of the nations to be directly 
examined, some potential problems are clear. For example Turkey possesses only 
three of Dahl’s requirements, while Brazil possesses all but two. Further, the six 
requirements that Brazil possesses incorporate all three that are present in Turkey. 
It is therefore dif cult to imagine that the citizens of Brazil and Turkey genuinely 
experience democracy in an identical manner, although the identical scores on 
Bollen’s composite index would suggest they do. The QCA measure, in these 
cases, affords more thorough representation of the democratic composition (and 
one could readily assume the experience of democracy as well) in these nations 
than is possible through a summary score or summary classi cation.
The  nal bene t of the adaptability of this measurement approach removes one 
of the weaknesses of the proposed approach. In QCA analysis, each component 
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measure must be coded as the simple absence or presence of the particular 
characteristic. In Fuzzy Set Social Science, Ragin (2000) introduces methods 
that allow for the comparative approach that we describe here, but eliminate the 
necessity to reduce measures to 0/1 presence/absence categories. With such an 
extension, the “full disclosure” of measurement that is suggested in this paper 
would be extended even further, eliminating the necessity of most information 
reduction. In this paper we sought to demonstrate the potential advantages of 
taking a comparative approach to measuring democracy; which could be readily 
extended to include fuzzy-set logic.
5. DISCUSSION
Using a QCA measure of democracy allows us to overcome many of the dif culties 
experienced through the various reduction techniques necessary to produce 
dichotomous categorizations or continuous indices of democracy. Existing data 
sets such as Liberal Democracy (Bollen 2001) and Polity IV (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2001b) each have compiled data points that incorporate a vast array of 
contributing democratic components for numerous countries spanning extended 
periods of time. However, the scale creation techniques they employ often masks 
this richness within a simpli ed summary measure. When analysts merely include 
summary scores in their analyses of the relationship between democracy and other 
factors, their audience’s understanding of the relationships at issue may be limited 
because the multifaceted nature of democracy remains opaque. The approach we 
propose facilitates an understanding of democracy along multiple dimensions, 
thus reducing this limitation. Also, by showing how this measure is constructed 
we allow for simple replication or modi cation so that other researchers can easily 
reap the bene ts of this alternative analytic strategy.
By using a QCA measure of democracy, researchers are not forced to compare 
potentially incomparable democratic components either directly or through complex 
weighting procedures. This measure also eliminates the practice in dichotomous 
measures’ need to debate the characteristic or limited set of characteristics 
necessary for democratic quali cation. Instead, researchers can include the full 
scope of all collected information in any desired analysis. Subsequent use of this 
measure could provide further support for existing theories by accounting for 
outliers and contradictory cases, as well as extending these theories to cover cases 
that must be excluded from more traditional analytic strategies. 
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NOTES
1  Here we seek to highlight the importance of how individual components are included and 
combined in a measure – not to debate what individual components should be included 
in a measure. We will highlight the importance of the adaptability of our method of 
measurement – including the ability to substitute any other component set – in a later 
section of the paper.
2  Where LIBDEM = (X1 + X2) / 2 where X1=SUFF if SUFF < (POLRT + LEG) / 0.2, 
otherwise X1= (POLRT + LEG) / O.2, X2=PARTY*10 (Bollen, 2001, p.26). Where 
LEG = (LEGSEL * LEGEF) / 10 (Bollen 2001:84).
3  Arat calculates his score as: Democraticness = [(Participation x (1 + Inclusiveness) + 
Competitiveness] – Coerciveness (1991:26).
4  As mentioned, the number of existing measures is vast, and we limit our discussion to 
only a few of the existing measures. For a more thorough review, see Inkeles (1991) or 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002).
5  This necessary and suf cient classi cation is the explicit motivation for most 
dichotomous, or ideal-typical democracy classi cations. Existing researchers’ differing 
opinions of which characteristics to include is the very reason for the numerous existing 
ideal-typical classi catory schemes.
6  These transformations are calculated by holding all values in Bollen’s index constant 
at their highest values other than suffrage and political rights which we change 
respectively from 100 to 50 and 10 to  ve, resulting in liberal democracy scores 
of 75 and 87.5 respectively. (See footnote 2 for the precise formulas used in these 
calculations.)
7  For a more thorough discussion of the methods and general applications of QCA, see 
Ragin (2000; 1987), and for a few speci c applications of QCA, see for example Berg-
Schlosser (1998) and Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (1994).
8  Ragin (2000) also proposes methods for incorporating multiple cutoff points, which 
allows classi cation beyond zero and one, but for this paper we limit the discussion to 
the most basic application of the QCA method. Once we show the advantages of the 
comparative approach, perhaps later extensions of our measurement strategy can extend 
this to also include the “fuzzy set” logic in Ragin’s later work.
9  In QCA, “necessary and suf cient” conditions are not identi ed individually (as would 
be the approach in regression-based variable approaches), but in combinations – looking 
for the simplest representation of all combinations of necessary and suf cient conditions. 
All subsequent uses of the word “reduced” in this paper rely on this formal notion of 
necessary and suf cient identi cation, and not more common understandings of the 
term.
10  The countries we include in this analysis (listed in Appendix 2) are those with full data 
on the seven measures listed above, and have libdem, Polity IV and Freedom house 
scores for 1988.
11  We should note that these terms do not include Dahl’s requirement of availability of 
alternative sources of information, since this is addressed by other variables (at least 
operationally). Further, freedom of expression and the availability of alternative sources 
of information are somewhat simultaneously incorporated in the measure we use to 
measure freedom of expression (Humana’s [1986], freedom of information).
12  This was the seemingly most natural breakpoint in the data used. Further, there were 
no countries observed with libdem scores equal to 95.00. Using other cutoffs does not 
substantially alter the pattern demonstrated in this table.
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13  By 1988 all of the included nations extended the right to vote to females. As such, despite 
its potential relevance (Paxton 2000), we leave female suffrage out of all subsequent 
analyses for this example. 
14  A similar equation could be constructed based only on a subset of terms as deemed 
appropriate, but any such term should again include the presence of all included variables.
15  We should note at this point that it is possible that this  nding is due to the fact that 
all possible combinations are not observed. This could result either from limiting the 
included nations or simply because the combinations do not exist. Neither of these 
possibilities however would be observable if we examined only a summarized composite 
score.
16  For some critics, this conceptual entanglement may also set the stage for interrogating the 
generalizations gleaned from research based on composite democracy scores. This is not 
something we wish to explore directly here, but instead offer a measure that would allow 
such questions to be more readily addressed in subsequent research through adopting our 
measure.
17  Measured in constant 2005 US dollars.
18  We include here nations from Western and Eastern Europe plus the nations that comprised 
the former USSR for 1985, 1990 and 1995. While we could explore this case in depth, 
we refrain for now – to keep the emphasis simply on the methodological improvements 
available with the new measure. A vast literature examines the particular situation of 
these countries and this time period. Further, the  ndings here do not contradict any 
of those studies, rather may offer some insight into further clarifying the relationships 
suggested by previous research, particularly by more readily identifying those country 
cases that weaken the statistical relationships observed in existing research.
19  The computation of the POLITY score is DEMOC – AUTOC. Each of these components 
range from 0 to 10, with the computed total therefore ranging from –10 to 10. For detailed 
methods of calculation for each of these indices (which include speci c additions and 
subtractions per each score for each of the  ve terms detailed above), see Marshall and 
Jaggers (2001a:11-14).
20  We should note here that the presence of the E term is observed for all countries in all 
time periods in these data. Additionally, xjVER at t0 lead to GDP increase from t0-t1 in 
66% of the observed cases (not suf cient to qualify at p<0.10).
21  The other con guration that we observe frequently is xjvEr, which leads to GDP increases 
4/19 times from t0-t1 and 16/23 times from t1-t2.
22  For the nations without full data available, the partial terms are: Hunduras – MGEfrV, 
Sudan – MGEfRv, Uruguay – MGEfRV. (Note, in this case the absence of the X and J 
terms for these nations denotes that the indicator was not measured in that year.)  Also, it 
should be noted that these nations achieve scores ranging from 6-8 on the Polity IV scale 
(Marshall and Jaggers 2001b), and Freedom House (2001) labels each of these nations 
as free, with the exception of Turkey, which is designated as partially free.
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Appendix 1 QCA Democracy, Libdem, Polity IV Freedom House and Polyarchy Scores, 1988
Country QCA Democracy Ratings Libdem Score Polity Freedom in the World Vanhanen
SWEDEN        M G E F X J R V 99.9 10 F 36.18
DENMARK       M G E F X J R V 99.875 10 F 45.43
UNITED KINGDOM M G E F X j R V 99.75 10 F 32.95
FINLAND       M G E F X J R V 99.75 10 F 38.69
ITALY         M G E F X J R V 99.65 10 F 44.22
UNITED STATES M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 16.73
TRINIDAD      M G E F X j R V 99.5 9 F 15.07
NEW ZEALAND   M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 28.81
JAPAN         M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 25.15
IRELAND       M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 28.01
COSTA RICA    M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 21.18
CANADA        M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 28.79
BELGIUM       M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 43.54
AUSTRIA       M G E F X J R V 99.5 10 F 36.47
SWITZERLAND   M G E F X J R V 99.4 10 F 20.65
PORTUGAL      M G E F X J R V 99.4 10 F 28.12
NORWAY        M G E F X J R V 99.4 10 F 37.06
NETHERLANDS   M G E F X J R V 99.4 10 F 41.01
FRANCE        M G E F X j r V 99.4 9 F 32.02
AUSTRALIA     M G E F X j R V 99.25 10 F 30.79
INDIA         M G E f X j R V 95.8333 8 F 16.24
GREECE        M G E f X J R V 95.8333 10 F 34.74
JAMAICA       M G E f X J R V 87.5 10 F 0.12
ECUADOR       M G E f X j R V 87.5 -5 F 18.41
COLOMBIA      M G E f x j r V 87.5 8 F 10.16
BOTSWANA      M G E f X j R V 87.5 9 F 6.91
BOLIVIA       M G E f x j R V 87.5 9 F 8.76
SPAIN         M G E F X J R V 83.3333 10 F 28.96
MEXICO        M G E f x j r V 83.3333 0 PF 11.39
GERMANY WEST  M G E F X J R V 83.0833 10 F 34.53
VENEZUELA     M G E F X J r V 82.3333 9 F 18.75
ISRAEL        M G E f x j R V 79.1667 9 F 35.41
ARGENTINA     M G E f X J R V 79.1667 8 F 24.05
DOMINICAN REP M G E F X j r V 75 6 F 18.34
TURKEY        M G E f x j r v 70.8333 7 PF 29.05
PHILIPPINES   M G E f x j R V 70.8333 8 F 17.01
PERU          M G E f x j r V 70.8333 7 F 15.28
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KOREA S-(ROK) M G E f x j r V 70.8333 6 F 33.21
BRAZIL        M G E f X J r V 70.8333 8 F 7.81
THAILAND      M G E f x j r v 66.6667 3 PF 5.69
SRI LANKA     M G E f x j r V 66.6667 5 PF 16.28
PAKISTAN      M G E f x j R V 66.6667 8 PF 11.54
MOROCCO       M G e f x j r v 62.5 -8 PF 0.94
MALAYSIA      M G E f x j r v 62.5 4 PF 12.25
SENEGAL       M G E f X j r v 58.3333 -1 PF 4.40
EGYPT         M G E f x j r v 50 -5 PF 2.43
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Appendix 1 (cont’d). QCA Democracy, Libdem, Polity IV Freedom House and Polyarchy 
Scores, 1988
Country QCA Democracy Ratings Libdem Score Polity
Freedom in 
the World Vanhanen
SINGAPORE     M G E f x j r V 45.8333 -2 PF 19.71
INDONESIA     M G E f x j r v 33.3333 -7 PF 16.24
SYRIA         M G E f x j r v 29.1667 -9 NF 0
PARAGUAY      M G E f x j r v 29.1667 -8 NF 3.47
PANAMA        M G E f X j r v 29.1667 -8 NF 14.75
BANGLADESH    M G e f x j r v 29.1667 -5 PF 4.25
YUGOSLAVIA    M G E f x j r V 25 -5 PF 0
TUNISIA       M G E f x j r v 20.8333 -5 PF 0
TANZANIA      M G E f x j r V 20.8333 -7 NF 0.99
SIERRA LEON   M G E f x j r v 16.6667 -7 PF 0.02
POLAND        M G E f x j r V 16.6667 -6 PF 0.28
LIBERIA       M G e f x j r v 16.6667 -6 PF 0
HUNGARY       M G E f x j r v 16.6667 -2 PF 0
ALGERIA       M G E f x j r v 16.6667 -9 NF 3.21
ZAMBIA        M G E f x j r v 12.5 -9 PF 0.88
VIETNAM       M G E f x j r v 12.5 -7 NF 0
SOVIET UNION  M G E f x j r v 12.5 -6 NF 0
KENYA         M G E f x j r V 12.5 -7 NF 0
ETHIOPIA      M G E f x j r v 12.5 -8 NF 0
CHINA         M G E f x j r v 12.5 -7 NF 0
CAMEROON      M G E f x j r v 12.5 -8 NF 0
ROMANIA       M G E f x j r V 8.3333 -8 NF 1.59
KOREA N-(DPR) M G E f x j r v 8.3333 -9 NF 0
IRAQ          M G E f x j r v 8.3333 -9 NF 0
GERMANY EAST  M G E f x j r v 8.3333 -9 NF 0.07
CZECHOSLOVAKIA M G E f x j r v 8.3333 -7 NF 0.07
CUBA          M G e f x j r v 8.3333 -7 NF 0
CHILE         M G e f x j r v 8.3333 -1 PF 0
BULGARIA      M G E f x j r v 8.3333 -7 NF 0
BENIN         M G e f x j r v 8.3333 -7 NF 0
NIGERIA       m G e f x j r v 0 -7 PF 0
LIBYA         m G e f x j r v 0 -7 NF 0
HAITI         m G e f x j r v 0 -7 NF 0
GHANA         m G e f x j r v 0 -7 NF 0
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